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discourses on technology “shows that the causal link between an embrace of
technological change and fantasies of destruction, which laid the mental foun-
dations for actual atrocities, is more strongly contingent upon a nation’s political
culture” (p. 284) than the Horkheimer/Adorno tradition allows.
If I have any criticism, it is that Rieger’s concluding discussion does not ade-
quately convey the historiographical implications of the book’s innovative meth-
odology. Rieger has brought together quite different case studies, which he
nevertheless melds into an integrated tapestry, displaying two nations’ ideas
about the relation of technology to war and peace, to tradition and modernity,
to nationalism, identity, and morality, and to social organization and social
place. The analysis and presentation of this complex yet coherent tapestry offers
a fresh approach that takes the social and cultural history of technology to a
higher level. This, to my mind, is the book’s most important contribution.
Eda Kranakis
University of Ottawa
TOEWS, John Edward — Becoming Historical: Cultural Reformation and Public
Memory in Early Nineteenth-Century Berlin. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004. Pp. 466.
In many ways, Berlin of the early 1840s seems an unlikely site for an exploration of
the relationship between the historical principle, ethical-national community, and
modern definitions of selfhood. Ruled by Frederick William IV, who ascended to
the throne as Prussian king in 1840, it has long been associated with a religiously
inspired conservative restoration — the determined efforts to turn back the forces
of early-nineteenth-century reform liberalism, participatory nationalism, and
democratic revolution. In this extraordinary book, however, John Toews draws
our attention not only to the elements of “authoritarian containment” (p. 14)
embedded in the new regime’s intellectual and artistic commitments but also to
the preoccupations with ethical subjectivity momentarily opened up or dialecti-
cally called forth by its anti-Hegelian cultural politics. As Toews demonstrates,
the new Prussian regime pursued an innovative programme of “cultural reforma-
tion” (p. 19) designed to create Prusso-German national subjects who embraced
the historical principle at its core: the claim or assumption that personal identities
and human communities are the products of determined and determining acts
of individual and collective “self-making” in time, especially those involving the
self-conscious or “subjective identification” (p. 133) of individuals with a shared
national past and public memory, rather than being the logical outcomes of
self-contained systems of rational thought and bureaucratic state direction or
the entailed expressions of essential, pre-reflective ethnicities. In identifying the
centrality of a new, post-Romantic historicism in early-nineteenth-century Berlin
in this way, Toews provides both a rich analysis of this critical moment in
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Prussian-German history, which makes strikingly original connections between
the works of a wide range of thinkers and artists and a deeply learned reflection
on debates over the formation of individual selfhood and ethical community that
have preoccupied historians and philosophers since the early nineteenth century.
The book is framed by discussions of historical selfhood in the anti-Hegelian
philosophy of Schelling at the outset and the anti-philosophical critiques of
Hegel produced by Kierkegaard and Marx at the end, but its central chapters
explore the intellectual and artistic trajectories of several major philosophers,
scholars, and artists involved in Frederick William’s efforts to promote a new
German national culture: the scholar and ambassador Christian Carl Josias
Bunsen, the king’s former tutor; the architect and guiding force of the Prussian
State Building Commission Karl Friedrich Schinkel; the composer Felix
Mendelssohn; the jurists Freidrich Karl von Savigny and Friedrich Julius Stahl;
the philologist and folklorist Jacob Grimm; and the historian Leopold von
Ranke. Each of these figures, according to Toews, travelled a broadly similar intel-
lectual path from a post-Kantian vision of Romantic Idealism and ethnic nation-
alism, which was forged in the national liberation struggles against Napoleon and
placed its hopes in the immanent, self-organizing capacities of an emancipated
people, to a chastened project of limited national reform, which emphasized the
historical formation of a “self-legislating” (p. 119) German-national community
under the guidance of established paternal authority and the transcendental
force of (Protestant) Christianity.
Toews traces these individual projects, as well as their tensions in relation to
Frederick William’s own cultural project, in illuminating empirical detail and
with daunting theoretical sophistication. After exploring Schelling’s attempts to
establish a religiously oriented, “positive” philosophy in response to a regnant
Hegelianism in Berlin, he begins with an analysis of Bunsen’s plans to
“redeem” German nationality in the wake of the post-Napoleonic settlements.
This project of redemption, which Toews examines primarily in Bunsen’s writings
on Protestant hymnals and prayer books of the early 1830s as well as church ritual,
architecture, and ecclesiastical organization in the 1840s, involved a turn away
from an earlier focus on the immanent expression of national cultures in the
ineluctable evolution of historical forms of human community and toward a call
for the formation of an ethical community of Christian believers as “self-relating”
subjects (p. 104), guided by the church and the normative, transcendent, and patri-
archal principles of divine authority — the “law of the father” (p. 81) — and rea-
lized in acts of public religious commemoration. In a slightly different way,
Schinkel’s architectural vision moved from his early Romantic preference for
Gothic design — most visible in his 1814–1815 sketches of a Cathedral of
Liberation in Berlin — as the spatial representation of the liberated (awakened
to its essence) and “self-transcending” German nation, to his neo-classical plans
for public buildings (for example, the Altes Museum or Old Museum), which
sought to educate German subjects into an ethical bearing by means of historical
narratives articulating lessons of civic order. These pedagogical functions were
also expressed in Mendelssohn’s more religiously inspired musical compositions,
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ranging from his early Reformation Symphony to his later oratorios (especially
Elijah). The latter reveal complex modes of instrumentation, vocal arrangements,
and compositional structures that were designed to facilitate acts of ethical-
national self-making out of the dialectic between received ethnicity and self-
conscious interaction with a “divine personality.” Indeed, this dialectic emerged
equally forcefully in the writings of those scholars of jurisprudence, nationality,
and history usually identified as the founders of the Historical School: Savigny,
Grimm, and Ranke. By 1840, both Savigny and Stahl had given up their earlier
“Romantic-Idealist” treatments of the historical evolution of law strictly in
terms of a body of jurisprudence organically evolved within an ethnic community
in favour of a definition of law as a set of ethical norms derived in part from
human interaction with a “transcendent other” and imposed from above by mon-
archical and church authority. Grimm, in his studies of Germanic myths, legends,
folk tales, grammar, and languages, had abandoned his earlier quest to locate
national identities in the organic or spontaneous expression of “natural poetry”
in favour of a scheme that granted the importance of “artificial poetry” or the
self-conscious forms of cultural expression of an ethnic people; Ranke, whose his-
torical writings had once emphasized the continuities between the “essential
unity” (p. 381) among Germans in the past and present, had come to emphasize
the authority of transcendent religion and the state in the historical process by
which a nation was guided into being.
This general intellectual context, Toews argues, prompted Kierkegaard and
Marx to develop their own understandings of the historical nature of individual
subjectivity. In a fascinating epilogue, Toews examines the shared concerns of
these two thinkers, beginning with their rejection of the “conceptual abstraction”
of Hegelian philosophical systems and their efforts to theorize self-conscious iden-
tity from the ground of “prelinguistic” being (p. 420). If Kierkegaard began with a
focus on psychological desire and Marx with a focus on labour, both philosophers
sought to develop theories that would rescue individual selfhood from ever more
powerful processes of objectification and commodification in an emergent bour-
geois society. They rejected blind or unselfconscious being and emphasized the
attainment of freedom through volitional acts of self-making or “self-choice” —
Kierkegaard in relation to a “leap” into religion and Marx in relation to commu-
nist revolution and the collective human appropriation of the means of
production.
No short review can possibly do justice to this beautifully researched and pro-
foundly thoughtful book. It is no ordinary monograph. A major sequel to Toews’s
still unsurpassed study of Hegelianism, this work has much to communicate to
intellectual historians, cultural critics, and philosophers interested in Prusso-
German politics of the early nineteenth century, historical culture in nineteenth-
century Europe, and “modern” theories of human subjectivity and historical
self-consciousness.
Dennis Sweeney
University of Alberta
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